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Introduction 
 
In ​The Will to Power​, Nietzsche writes the following: 
  
Philosophers … have trusted in concepts as completely as they have mistrusted the senses: they 
have not stopped to consider that concepts and words are our inheritance from ages in which 
thinking was very modest and unclear. … What dawns on philosophers last of all: they must no 
longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create 
them, present them and make them convincing. Hitherto one has generally trusted one's concepts 
as if they were a wonderful dowry from some sort of wonderland: but they are, after all, the 
inheritance from our most remote, most foolish as well as most intelligent ancestors. …What is 
needed above all is an absolute skepticism toward all inherited concepts.   2
  
Nietzsche here articulates a radical skepticism about all inherited concepts. Philosophers should question 
whether the concepts we have are good enough and should engage in conceptual critique. What emerges, 
thinks Nietzsche, is the following: we should not just improve the concepts we’ve been given, reforming 
1 ​This paper has benefited enormously from many discussions with other philosophers. We owe a particular debt to 
Alexis Burgess, our co–editor of this volume. We would also especially like to thank Derek Ball, Josh Dever, Matti 
Eklund, Øystein Linnebo, Tristram McPherson, Tim Sundell, Amie Thomasson, David Braddon–Mitchell, Peter 
Galison, Sally Haslanger, Peter Railton, Rachel Sterken, and Kevin Scharp. Note that the views in this introduction 
are not the considered views of either Cappelen or of Plunkett. Their own considered views can be found in 
(Cappelen 2018) and (Plunkett 2015). The aim of this introduction is to provide an easily accessible entry point for 
those not already invested in the topic.  
2 ​(Nietzsche 1968, 220–221, section 409). Thanks to Michael Beany for pointing us to this passage. 
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or “polishing” them in minor ways, but also create new ones – concepts not tainted by the “most foolish 
of our ancestors”. 
  
Even if you think Nietzsche’s claim is more than a bit hyperbolic, you might think some more moderate 
version of this skepticism and his approach is justified. For example: maybe ​some​ of the concepts we 
have inherited are defective, or at least not as good as they could be for our current purposes. In contrast, 
maybe you think Nietzsche is wildly off here in his radical stance. Maybe we have good reason to think 
that our current stock of concepts is just fine for the purposes at hand. Or maybe you think that, even if 
that stock of concepts could be better, it doesn’t make sense to think about changing our concepts – or at 
least not the core concepts that really matter in philosophy (e.g., ᴛʀᴜᴛʜ, ᴍᴇᴀɴɪɴɢ, ​C​O​N​T​E​N​T​ , or  V​A​L​U​E​ ).  3
The issues that this quote from Nietzsche brings up thus includes questions such as: What are the 
dimensions of assessment for concepts? What philosophical concepts are defective and how can we 
improve them? How important are facts about the history (or “genealogy”) of our use of concepts to the 
assessment of our current concepts? These are questions at the heart of the fields that we call “conceptual 
engineering” and “conceptual ethics”.  
 
If you care about these and related questions, this volume should be of interest to you. It is the first ever 
volume devoted entirely to conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. Our hope is that it will help 
shape and promote what we (the editors) take to be an important, exciting and underexplored part of 
philosophy. In these introductory remarks, we first try to delineate the field and explain why we are using 
two different expressions (‘conceptual engineering’ and ‘conceptual ethics’) to describe the topics in the 
book. We then turn to some of the central foundational issues that arise for conceptual engineering and 
conceptual ethics, and finally we outline various views one might have about their role in philosophy and 
inquiry more generally.  
 
1. ‘Conceptual Engineering’ and ‘Conceptual Ethics’ 
The title of this volume uses two expression to describe its topic: ‘conceptual engineering’ and 
‘conceptual ethics’ . Why? The answer to this is not straightforward. We don’t think these expressions 
come with fixed meanings. The previous literature has used them in different ways and so do the authors 
in ​this volume. ​These terms are often used without precise definitions by those working in the field. 
Moreover, when they are given more precise definitions by philosophers, these definitions often 
contradict those given by others. As editors, we could have played the terminology police for those 
contributing to this volume. But that would be an exercise in futility. Instead, we have decided to let a 
thousand (or at least a few) flowers bloom. Contributors use central terms, such as ‘conceptual 
engineering’ and ‘conceptual ethics’, and ‘revision’, and ‘amelioration’, in different ways, often explicitly 
so. That’s how it should be given that this is currently a fast moving literature involving philosophers 
from many different background and sub-fields. That said, for the purposes of this introduction, we will 
3 In this paper, we use small caps (e.g. ​C​A​T​ ) to pick out concepts, single quotation marks (e.g. ‘cat’) strictly to 
mention linguistic items, and double quotation marks (e.g. “cat”) for a variety of tasks, including quoting others’ 
words, scare quotes, and mixes of use and mention. 
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offer our own characterizations of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, with one of us 
(Cappelen) offering a characterization of conceptual engineering, and the other of us (Plunkett) offering 
one of conceptual ethics.  The basic reason we split up our discussion in this way is that one of us 4
(Cappelen) likes to use the expression “conceptual engineering”, whereas the other one (Plunkett) thinks 
that a number of the issues involved are best described as issues in “conceptual ethics” rather than 
“conceptual engineering”. 
 
 
Conceptual Engineering  
 
According to Cappelen (2018), ​conceptual engineering is concerned with the assessment and 
improvement of concepts​. However, since it’s unclear and controversial what concepts are (and whether 
there are any), it’s better to broaden the scope along the following lines: 
  
Conceptual Engineering ​= (i) The assessment of representational devices, (ii) reflections on and 
proposal for how to improve representational devices, and (iii) efforts to implement the proposed 
improvements.  5
  
Here are some issues that are central for those working on conceptual engineering: 
  
● What are the relevant representational devices? Possible answers include: concepts (as they are 
construed in some part of psychology or philosophy), lexical items, and the semantic values of 
lexical items.  A closely connected cluster of questions concerns whether they are in language or 6
thought or both. Different conceptual engineers will give different answers and that will have 
enormous implications for how the field is understood and practiced.  
 
● Given an answer to the first cluster of questions, we can ask: What kinds of defects can 
representational devices have? Throughout the history of philosophy, a variety of defects have 
been proposed: cognitive defects (that undermine our ability to reason properly), moral or 
political defects (that undermine moral or political values of various sorts), theoretical defects 
(that undermine progress within some theoretical field), or semantic defects (where the semantic 
value is incoherent, incomplete, or missing). For illustrations of all of these and a more detailed 
taxonomy of defects, see (Cappelen 2018, chapter 2). 
 
● Once you have detected a defect in a representational device you care about, it’s natural to think 
about how to improve it. What are the ameliorative strategies? There are four basic options once 
4 ​Our use of the term ‘conceptual engineering’ stems from (Cappelen 2018), drawing chiefly on (Scharp 2013) and ( 
Eklund 2015). Simon Blackburn also briefly uses ‘conceptual engineering’ in the opening pages of (Blackburn 
2001) in a related way, as does (Brandom 2001).  Our use of the term ‘conceptual ethics’ draws from (Burgess and 
Plunkett 2013a) and (Burgess and Plunkett 2013b).  
5 ​Why call it ‘conceptual’ engineering when it’s about representational devices more generally? Purely for aesthetic 
reason: ‘representational devices engineering’ doesn’t roll off the tongue in the way ‘conceptual engineering’ does. 
6 (​Cappelen 2018) suggests we think of the basic case as that of revising the extension and intensions of expression. 
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you’ve identified a defect in ​C​ : (i) Do nothing – just live with it (can’t improve it, can’t get rid of 
it), (ii) Abandonment of ​C​ (it’s so defective it can’t be improved) (iii) Improvement of ​C​, (iv) 
Replacement of ​C​ (for certain purposes, in certain contexts).  
 
● Once you have settled on an ameliorative strategy, you might want to do some work to implement 
it, i.e., you might want to engage in a bit of activism on behalf of your ameliorative strategy. If 
that’s something you want to do, it raises an ‘implementation challenge’: how are ameliorative 
strategies best implemented?  
  
If you’re interested in conceptual engineering, you don’t need to focus on all of these issues. Some will 
focus on discovering defects, some on ameliorative strategies, others on conceptual activism, and yet 
others want to do the whole shebang. 
  
Conceptual Engineering is not usefully construed as a branch of any other part of philosophy. It will draw 
on insights from philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology, political philosophy, 
philosophy of science, ethics, and other field. That, of course, is also true about these other fields (i.e., 
they will draw on insights from each other). A case can, however, be made that Conceptual Engineering is 
prior to or more fundamental than all other philosophical disciplines. The argument is simple and 
obvious: reflection and argumentation in any part of philosophy must rely on concepts (epistemology 
relies heavily on e.g., ​K​N​O​W​L​E​D​G​E​ and  J​U​S​T​I​F​I​C​A​T​I​O​N​ , ethics on e.g.,  O​U​G​H​T​ and  B​A​D​ , and so on for each 
branch of philosophy.) As Nietzsche correctly observes in the passage at the beginning of this 
introduction: it’s intellectually irresponsible to throw yourself headlong into an inquiry before questioning 
the concepts you’re using in that inquiry. So conceptual engineering, as construed here, comes first.  7
 
 
Conceptual Ethics  
 
Now that we have a rough characterization of conceptual engineering from one of us (Cappelen), here is a 
rough one of conceptual ethics, endorsed by the other one of us (Plunkett), drawing on previous 
co-authored work with Alexis Burgess.  Broadly, conceptual ethics concerns a range of normative and 8
evaluative issues about thought, talk, and representation. Those include issues about which concepts we 
should use, ways in which concepts can be defective, what we should mean by our words, and when we 
should refrain from using certain words. (Which issues one thinks belong on this list, as well as how these 
issues are related to each other, will obviously depend on one’s further philosophical commitments.) As 
the label suggests, some of the core issues in conceptual ethics concern ​concepts ​(assuming, for now, that 
there are such things). These include, centrally, normative issues about which concepts one should use 
(and why) and evaluative issues about which concepts are better than others (and why). Concepts can here 
be understood in rough terms as ​constituent components of thoughts​, leaving it for different theorists to 
fill out that schematic characterization in different ways. As with conceptual engineering, parallel 
7 ​This raises tricky questions about the nature of the concepts used to think about conceptual engineering – for more 
on that see (Cappelen 2018), Chapter 1. 
8 (Burgess and Plunkett 2013a) and (2013b) 
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questions can of course arise for other representational devices beyond concepts (e.g., words, if there are 
any). 
  
The use of the term ‘ethics’ here in ‘conceptual ethics’ is meant very broadly, to cover “both the study of 
what one should or ought to do (dually, what can permissibly be done) as well as the study of which 
actions and outcomes are good or bad, better or worse.”  Thus, this use of ‘ethics’ is thus ​not​ meant to 9
privilege moral/political norms in particular (vs. e.g., those that find their central home in epistemology, 
metaphysics, aesthetics, etc.)  10
 
Conceptual ethics is a branch of normative and evaluative inquiry, just as (at least certain parts of) 
epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, and political philosophy can be understood as branches of it. Thus, just 
as with other branches of normative and evaluative inquiry, people can approach conceptual ethics with 
very different philosophical commitments, very different views about how to make progress in it, and 
very different substantive views within it. Moreover, they can also approach it for very different reasons. 
For example, someone might be interested in conceptual ethics purely as an interesting part of 
philosophical theorizing. Or one might be interested in it because one is trying to actually change existing 
thought and talk. 
  
This second point brings out an important aspect of the relation between conceptual ethics and those 
components of conceptual engineering that involve trying to actually change conceptual or linguistic 
practices. If one has such practical aims, then studying conceptual ethics might help. This is parallel to 
how studying normative political philosophy might help those interested in changing actual existing 
political institutions, or how studying normative aesthetics might help those creating art. But just as it 
would be a mistake to think of political philosophy ​solely ​in terms of the role it might play for the project 
of creating better political institutions, so too would it be a mistake to think of conceptual ethics solely in 
terms of the role it might play in practical projects of changing actual conceptual or linguistic practices. 
Conceptual ethics is a free-standing area of normative and evaluative inquiry, and some questions in it 
that might turn out to be of little use to those involved in actually trying to change conceptual or linguistic 
practices, or to those trying to engineer concepts. 
 
In what follows, we will use the term ‘conceptual engineering’ and ‘conceptual ethics’ in roughly the 
ways introduced here. How exactly conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics relate to each other is 
something which there is live debate about in this area, and which the editors of this volume themselves 
have spent considerable time arguing about. Many of those engaged in these debates use the term 
‘conceptual engineering’ and ‘conceptual ethics’ in ways that differ from our own. With that in mind, it 
should be emphasized  that all of the issues we discuss below can be translated into other ways of using 
9 (Burgess and Plunkett, 2013a, 1094).  
10 ​This is obviously not an ideal label. Many will still hear ‘ethics’ more narrowly – e.g., as tied to distinctively 
practical​ norms of the sort that have their home in moral and political philosophy. But other possible labels have 
their own drawbacks. For example: ‘conceptual assessment’, another possible label here, makes it sound as this area 
solely concerned ​evaluative​ claims about concepts (e.g., which concepts are better than others), leaving out 
normative​ claims (e.g., about which concepts an agent should use).  
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the labels ‘conceptual engineering’ and ‘conceptual ethics’ preferred by different philosophers (including 
some in this volume). 
 
2. A Bottom-up Characterization of Conceptual Engineering and 
Conceptual Ethics  
 
We just gave what can be thought of as a top-down characterization of the topic of this volume. Another 
way to approach this is through examples. We could point to a range of paradigmatic cases as 
exemplifying conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. We then hope that audiences will be able to 
find some relevant cluster of similarities between the examples.  Here are four paradigmatic cases:  11
 
● Carnapian explication is an effort to improve on defective meanings. For Carnap the central 
defects have to do with vagueness and indeterminacy. Improvements – what Carnap calls 
explications – produce better meanings. Improvements for Carnap focus primarily on theoretical 
virtues.   12
 
● Much of Sally Haslanger’s work on race and gender has two components: it criticizes our gender 
and race concepts, and then suggests ameliorative strategies, which is to say ways to improve 
those concepts. The defects she finds have to do with social and political effects of the meanings, 
and the ameliorations are also measured along those dimensions (e.g., by how much they can help 
us in the pursuit of social justice).   13
 
● Peter Railton argues that moral philosophy should involve a methodology that is largely 
continuous with that of the natural and social sciences (this is the core of his methodological 
naturalism). Based on what he sees as the best practices within scientific inquiry, he argues that, 
in doing moral philosophy, we shouldn’t just rely on our folk concepts. Instead, we should reform 
the meanings of our words to zero in on the topics that really matter, and in providing 
explanations of the phenomena at hand. Railton then offers improved moral language that can be 
used in this way, including, for example, reforming definitions of key terms such as ‘moral 
goodness’ and ‘morality’.  14
 
● Matti Eklund and Kevin Scharp explore the idea that ​T​ R​U​T​H​ is inconsistent. If it is, that might be a 
serious defect (at least in some contexts). What might be needed is an improved, consistent, truth 
concept (or, in Scharp’s case, multiple concepts). We might, they claim, be okay with using an 
inconsistent concept in certain areas of our life. But, for the purposes of doing advanced 
11 ​See (Burgess and Plunkett 2013a) for a similar approach 
12 ​See (Carnap 1947/1956). 
13 ​See (Haslanger 2000). It should be noted that Haslanger’s views on conceptual engineering (and associated issues 
about the nature of concepts) have changed over time. So what we present here is only one strand of her thinking 
about the topic. See the collected papers in (Haslanger 2012) for a fuller view of her thinking on the topic. 
14 ​See (Railton 1986b), (Railton 1986a), as well as many of the other papers collected in (Railton 2003). 
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theoretical work in such areas as linguistics and logic, it would be better to avoid doing that, if 
possible.  15
 
Here’s the Bottom–up way to introduce the topics of this volume: It’s about ​that kind of activit​y or ​these 
kinds of issues​. The kind of thing they are doing, or the kinds of things they are discussing.  ​The 16
assumption then is that those activities form an interesting kind – a kind of activity or method or subject 
matter (or maybe all three at once).  The idea of there being ​some ​sort of interesting kind here is a 
working hypothesis. One challenge for those working in the field is to try to substantiate it. Some papers 
in this volume support that assumption, and some argue against it.  
 
3. Central Challenges 
 
We turn now to what we take to be some the central challenges in the areas of conceptual engineering and 
conceptual ethics. In what follows, we will often put the issues involved in terms of “conceptual 
engineering” rather than “conceptual ethics”. We do so both for ease of exposition, and because of our 
belief that engaging with issues in conceptual ethics is an important part of conceptual engineering. 
However, it should be kept in mind that many of the issues we discuss below apply equally to conceptual 
ethics and conceptual engineering. 
 
As a heuristic, it’s useful to divide these into two categories:  
 
● Category 1: Domain-general issues. 
● Category 2: Issues that arise in thinking about the evaluation and engineering of specific concepts 
or groups of concepts (e.g., race and gender concepts).  
 
As we’ll emphasize below, there’s arguably no sharp distinction here, and (at the very least) there are 
many important connections between category 1 and category 2. It’s a rough division. Our focus here 
(and in the volume as a whole) is on category 1, and how it interacts with category 2. Category 2 is huge, 
and the details are too diverse for us to even begin to cover them in this brief introductory essay. 
 
What follows is six clusters of interconnected issues and challenges that arise in work on conceptual 
engineering and conceptual ethics. Many of these overlap and all of them interact in various ways. It goes 
beyond the scope of this introduction to explore all those important connections, so we simply list a range 
of issues that strike us as both interesting and important and that we think will be central to debates in 
conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics in the years ahead.   17
15 See (Eklund 2002) and (Scharp 2013). 
16 ​To keep this introduction at manageable length, we have chosen to not go into great detail of specific cases. But to 
get a real sense of how the Bottom-Up approach would work, more details would obviously be needed. For more 
discussion of examples, see (Burgess and Plunkett 2013a), (Burgess and Plunkett 2013b), and (Cappelen 2018).  
17 ​Our list of central issues here draws heavily on our previous work, especially (Burgess and Plunkett 2013a), 
(Burgess and Plunkett 2013b), and (Cappelen 2018).  
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CLUSTER 1 
 
What are the objects being assessed and improved (and do they exist)?​ If the aim of conceptual 
engineering is to assess and improve concepts – or other representational devices – then we are ultimately 
on the hook for an account of what these objects are. There are very many theories of concepts.  18
Moreover, the term ‘concept’ is used in a variety of ways in philosophy, psychology, and ordinary speech. 
It is clear that not everyone in the debate means the same thing by the word ‘concept’, or is offering a 
theory of the same thing. If the objects of assessment are concepts, then one needs a theory of these things 
that makes it possible for them to be assessed and improved. Furthermore, one needs such a theory on 
which either their identity conditions are compatible with the idea of amelioration of a single concept, or 
where it makes sense to think of moving from one concept to another as a form of improvement. If the 
objects are not concepts, but something else, then that something else needs to be characterized (and, 
again, in a way that meets the above constraint that makes sense of the possibility of some kind of 
amelioration). For example, if the relevant objects are words or meanings, then those things also need to 
be characterized. Moreover, ​whatever​ the objects are that are being criticized and improved, there is the 
threat of skepticism that they actually exist.  (Think here, for example, about Quinean skepticism about 19
the analytic/synthetic distinction as the basis for a certain kind of skepticism about the existence of word 
“meanings”. ) 20
 
Concepts vs. Conceptions vs Beliefs​: Many people involved in conceptual engineering distinguish 
concepts from beliefs – e.g., understanding concepts as “constituent components” of beliefs (or other 
attitudes) in one way or another.  Many others also include “conceptions” as part of the picture here. 21
How exactly are these (and related) things distinguished? How ​should​ they be distinguished? If the 
answers here turn out certain ways, then perhaps many instances of conceptual engineering turn out not to 
be about engineering “concepts” at all, but rather something else.  
 
Metasemantic foundations: ​Some theorists think of “metasemantics” as the study of the metaphysical 
foundations of meaning: it provides various accounts of what makes it the case (or grounds) that our 
words have the meanings they have.  So understood, metasemantics is very important for conceptual 22
engineering (and for conceptual activists in particular): in order to change a meaning, you need to act on 
(or change in some way) that metaphysical foundation. So different views of metasemantics will generate 
different views of what conceptual engineering consists in. The parallel point applies about the import of 
work on the metaphysical foundations of other kinds of content, if one is seeking to assess and improve 
those kinds of content.  
 
18 ​See (Margolis and Laurence 1999) for a collection of papers advocating different approaches. 
19 ​An important question here is whether it is easier to meet this challenge when moving to one of these other 
objects instead of concepts. One of us (Cappelen) thinks it is. On the view advocated there, conceptual engineering 
concerns extensions/intensions of lexical items, rather than concepts. See (Cappelen 2018) for discussion. 
20 ​See, e.g., (Quine 1951). 
21 ​For example, see the gloss of concepts in (Burgess and Plunkett 2013a). 
22 ​See (Burgess and Sherman 2014). 
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Internalism vs externalism​: An important issue in metasemantics is the distinction between internalism 
and externalism. In rough terms, according to internalists, meaning depends on facts about the individual 
(e.g, facts about “what’s in her head”) and externalists deny this: they think meaning is determined at least 
in part by facts having to do with the history of linguistic usage, or complex use patterns over time, or the 
judgments of experts, or other things that are not individualistic. This divide might be put in terms of 
grounding (roughly, asymmetric metaphysical dependence of a certain kind) or supervenience 
(understood as a purely modal notion). There are important theoretical choice points here in the 
internalism vs. externalism debate, and the answers will profoundly affect how one thinks about and 
practices conceptual engineering.   Some of the key issues here extend beyond just whether one is an 23
internalist or externalist (about either mental or linguistic content). They also include intramural debates 
among each camp. For example, does the correct externalism involve facts about the future usage of 
speakers,  or is it perhaps tied to “correct” theories of the relevant subject matter in some (perhaps 24
indirect) way.  25
 
Normativity of Meaning. ​How sharp is the distinction between doing descriptive vs. normative work 
when engaged in the study of concepts, or of other representational devices? On some views, they will 
necessarily be deeply intertwined. On others, they are pretty far apart. And there is obviously room for a 
lot of middle ground here. Different theories in metasemantics (either about words or concepts) help 
inform these different views, as do different views about our thought and talk about semantics. For 
example, consider discussions about the “normativity of meaning”.  If claims about meaning (or about 26
mental content) are themselves always normative in some sense, how does this affect our understanding 
of the relationship of descriptive and normative work on concepts (or other representational devices)? For 
example: does it collapse the distinction between normative theorizing about concepts (“conceptual 
ethics”) and descriptive theorizing about concepts? Or are the kinds of normative issues here importantly 
distinct in some sense? 
 
Within our Control vs Outside of our Control​: Many of those working on conceptual engineering are 
interested not just in general theories of conceptual engineering, but in actually bringing about conceptual 
or linguistic change. If that is part of one’s motivation, it’s important to get clear on whether conceptual 
change (or meaning change) is something that is within our control. And, if so, how ​much ​of it can we 
control, and how well can we control it? We need to get clear on the extent to which these kinds of 
changes are governed by our decisions, intentions, agreements, and preferences. Maybe, instead, they are 
governed by mechanisms that are difficult to understand and outside of our control.  One way these 27
issues about control matter is for evaluating strategies for conceptual activism.  
 
 
23 The literature here is vast. An overview and helpful bibliography is (Lau and Deutsch 2014) 
24 ​See, for example, the sort of view advocated for by Derek Ball in his chapter “​Revisionary Analysis without 
Meaning Change (Or, Could Women Be Analytically Oppressed)?” 
25 See, for example, the sort of view advocated for in (Schroeter and Schroeter 2014). 
26 See (Kripke 1982) and (Gibbard 2012) for defenses of the idea that “meaning is normative”, and for criticisms of 
the idea see, for example, (Hattiangadi 2017) and (Boghossian 1989).  
27 For an argument that much of the relevant changes are not in our control, see (Cappelen 2018). 
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CLUSTER 2 
 
What are the norms, goods, values etc. that determine the normative/evaluative facts in conceptual 
ethics? ​Here is a cluster of issues closely related to those discussed in the previous paragraph: 
Philosophers appeal to a wide variety of good, norms, values, etc. in making normative/evaluative claims 
in conceptual ethics. For example, some appeal to facts about what fundamental reality is like, 
independent of our thinking about it.  Others appeal to practical considerations of what would aid us in 28
theoretical inquiry on a given topic, for example by helping us zero in on an important set of issues, or 
helping us avoid false beliefs, or helping us smoothly communicate with other inquirers.  Others still 29
appeal to practical considerations about the ethical/political effects of the use of certain concepts – for 
example, the way that the use of certain concepts might help promote social justice, freedom, or 
happiness.  These different values/norms can interact in any number of ways. For example: it might be 30
that using concept ​C​ helps promote social justice because it helps us keep track of important features of 
social reality we should be studying. This diversity of goods/values/norms raises the question of which of 
them ultimately matter in conceptual ethics. And how much is there is a general answer here, anyway, as 
opposed to answers for specific kinds of concepts (e.g., for race and gender concepts, or for truth 
concepts, etc.)? 
 
What are potential defects and virtues of concepts? ​What counts as a defect of a concept and what are 
potential dimension of improvement? In the history of this topic, there have been a broad range of 
proposals. We can classify these into four rough categories: moral-political (e.g., hindering or promoting 
social justice), epistemological (e.g., hindering or promoting the acquisition of knowledge), cognitive 
(e.g., hindering or promoting good cognitive functioning), metaphysical defects (e.g., corresponding or 
not to joints in reality). Which of these proposals help us locate (and explain) genuine defects, and how 
are those defects related to each other?   31
 
How much do aims matter?​ We use concepts in very different contexts, in cases where we aim to 
accomplish very different things – e.g., making progress in mathematical inquiry vs. winning an election 
vs. trying to help build a better society. Many claims in conceptual engineering appeal to the aims an 
agent has in using a given concept (or set of concepts).  But how much do the aims an agent have matter 32
here? What if (for example) she has immoral aims, or aims that won’t be productive to furthering inquiry? 
Maybe what matters here are the aims an agent ​should ​have? Or maybe aims of any sort (either the ones 
an agent has, or the ones an agent should have) don’t play any sort of fundamental explanatory role here. 
Perhaps reference to aims is just a shorthand (and perhaps an unhelpful one) for talking about other 
factors that do the explanatory work, such as facts about where the joints in reality are, or facts about how 
people should live, or facts about how our social/political institutions should be organized.  
 
28 ​See, e.g., (Sider 2012). 
29 ​See, e.g., (Eklund 2002) and (Scharp 2013).  
30 ​See, e.g., (Haslanger 2000).  
31 ​For further discussion of this topic, see (Cappelen 2018). 
32 ​See, for example, (Haslanger 2000) and (Anderson 2001). For discussion, see (Burgess and Plunkett 2013b). 
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Scope of claims in conceptual engineering: ​Many of the claims involved in conceptual  engineering are 
aimed at particular people, in particular circumstances. For example, someone might make a claim in 
conceptual ethics  that “we should use concept ​A​ , instead of concept  B​ ”. Who is the “we” here? It might be 
every rational agent, or every human being. But, much of the time, it will be a more limited group of 
people: for example, philosophers involved in the study of language, or people involved in a certain sort 
of social activism. In many cases (as noted above), the claims will often also be tied to​ aims ​those people 
have, or the purposes they have in those contexts. Thus, many claims in conceptual ethics take the form of 
something along the lines of : “a group of agents should use concept ​A​ , instead of  B​ , in circumstances C, 
for purposes P”.  
 
 
CLUSTER 3 
 
What are the plausible ameliorative strategies? And which ones are better than others? ​Once one 
has found a defect in a concept, there are many types of ameliorative strategies that, at least prima facie, 
seem available. Which ameliorative strategy you endorse will be important for thinking about and 
engaging in conceptual activism. Here are some of those strategies:  
 
(i) Improve/reform the concept and then use that one.  
(ii) Replace uses of the concept with uses of a “explicated” concept which bears important 
similarities to the original one.  
(iii) Replace uses of the concept with uses of a very different concept. 
 
So far we have talked about improving/reforming concepts or uses of them, without being explicit about 
how this is reflected in language. It’s difficult to engage in conceptual engineering without that having 
linguistic connections. How one thinks about this will in large part depend on how one thinks of the 
connections between thought and talk. Here are some views about the linguistic implementations of 
(i)-(iii):  
 
(iv) Keep the lexical item and associate it with an improved/reformed concept.  
(v) Introduce a new lexical item with associated improved concept(s).  
(vi) Complete rejection: don’t use that expression or the associated concept again.  
 
This picture we just sketched presupposes that conceptual engineering operates on concepts and that these 
are then associated with (or expressed by) lexical items. As mentioned above, there are alternative views, 
according to which conceptual engineering operates directly on expressions and their 
intensions/extensions, so bypasses concepts entirely.  On this alternative view, here are some strategies 33
that at least prima facie seem available:  
 
(vii) Keep the lexical item and revise the intension/extension.  
33 See (Cappelen 2018). 
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(viii) Introduce a new lexical item with a new intension/extension and then let this new lexical 
item replace uses of the old one.  
(ix) Complete rejection: abandon the lexical item and its associated intension/extension. 
 
As this last paragraph makes clear, how one thinks of the range of ameliorative strategies will depend in 
large part on what one takes the objects of conceptual engineering to be (e.g., concepts vs conceptions vs 
words), and one’s views about their nature.  
 
Obviously some of these strategies might work well in some contexts and not in others. It is far from 
obvious that there is a context-invariant way to assess ameliorative strategies.  
 
What is the difference between improving concept ​C​ and improving one's beliefs about about 
objects in the extension of ​C​? Why choose one strategy over the other? ​An issue that keeps coming up 
in discussions of conceptual engineering is the difference between improving a concept, ​C​, on the one 
hand, and improving (or revising) people’s beliefs about objects in the extension of ​C​, on the other. Why 
and when is one strategy superior to the other? How do they interact? The answers to these questions will 
depend heavily on the answer to the three previous questions. It will depend on how one sees the 
connections between beliefs about ​C​-objects and possession of the concept ​C​ – for some there’s a 
constitutive connection, for others there isn’t a connection at all.  
 
Connections to ontology​: Closely connected to the above point: to what extent can conceptual 
engineering change non-linguistic and non-conceptual aspects of the world? An obvious connection is 
this: if conceptual engineering succeeds in a particular case, it will change how people think, talk, and act 
on the (non-conceptual and non-linguistic) world. However, some conceptual engineers go further. For 
theorists who think conceptual engineering operates directly on extension and intensions, the way to 
describe the effects of conceptual engineering (if the activism succeeds) is as a direct improvement of the 
non-linguistic and non-conceptual world.  On this view, we should not describe the effects of conceptual 34
engineering as an amelioration of the concept of ​F​R​E​E​D​O​M​ , but instead it is freedom itself that has been 
ameliorated. A final connection is this: for those who think conceptual engineering operates on concepts 
and also think that some concepts can be constitutive of some element of non-conceptual reality (e.g, 
parts of social reality), there’s an interesting connection: amelioration of an important social concept can 
change the nature of the relevant part of social reality (since the concept is partly constitutive of a some 
element of social reality).   35
 
Practical effects of conceptual engineering: ​How much practical import does conceptual engineering 
have? In what ways does it shape our thoughts, actions, and selves? And what about other parts of reality 
– e.g., those that might depend on our conceptual practices in some way?  In some cases, philosophers 
think the practical effects of conceptual engineering can be quite extensive and profound. But others are 
skeptical that engaging in conceptual engineering will have that big an impact at all (regardless of 
whether we are in control of that impact or not).  
34 See (Cappelen 2018). 
35 ​For example, this is true on the “dynamic nominalist” view that (Hacking 2002) argues for concerning the 
relationship between naming practices and kinds of people (or, relatedly, social identities). 
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CLUSTER 4 
 
Limits of revision and change of topic​: How much revision is too much? When is a revision a complete 
change of topic? When would it be okay to change the topic, including perhaps completely abandoning 
the old topic in doing so? If you revise the concept ​C​O​W​ to the concept  F​O​X​ (or replace ‘cow’ with ‘fox’), 
there’s no sense in which you have improved on ​C​O​W​ or ‘cow’. You’ve just started talking about foxes. 
You’ve changed the topic. So the general issue then is how far we can go in amelioration without a 
complete change in topic? What degree of change is acceptable?  36
 
Continuity of Inquiry: ​Consider again a debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism. 
This is an inquiry that has taken place over time involving many participants. Suppose as before that at 
some point during this the concept ​F​R​E​E​  W​I​L​L​ is ameliorated. We now have, in some sense, a better 
concept of ​F​R​E​E​  W​I​L​L​ . Does this constitute a discontinuity of inquiry: are we now engaged in an 
investigation of a new question and have we left the old question behind? Or is there some sense in which 
we can still say that we are discussing the same question as before, i.e. whether free will is compatible 
with determinism? If there has been a discontinuity, what does that mean for the ability of speakers to 
meaningfully disagree with each other from different sides of the divide? What does it mean for our views 
about intellectual progress within that inquiry, and the ability of inquiry to build toward something that is 
“objectively” better in some sense?  37
 
Conceptual engineering and Verbal Disputes​:  Consider again a dispute over whether free will is 
compatible with determinism? Suppose as before that at some point the concept of ‘free will’ is 
ameliorated. Here is an issue that’s closely related to the the issue of continuity of inquiry: Isn’t there now 
a significant risk of people engaging in verbal disputes? Those using the pre-ameliorated meaning for 
‘free will’ says ‘Free will is compatible with determinism’’, and then those using the ameliorated concept 
will say: ‘Free will is not compatible with determinism’’. It will look like they are disagreeing, but since 
they mean different things, they might be engaged in a verbal disputes. Isn’t the entire project of engaging 
in conceptual engineering at risk of generating an endless amount of verbal disputes?   38
 
CLUSTER 5 
 
Conceptual fixed points: ​Are some concepts or terms so basic that they cannot be engineered (or at least 
not in a way that is rational, or well-supported by reasons)? Are some concepts or terms so fundamental 
that we are stuck with them, meaning that evolution, revision, and amelioration are impossible? David 
Chalmers and Matti Eklund have defended the idea that there are conceptual fixed points (or bedrock 
36 ​This issue is central to Strawson’s critique of Carnap on explication in (Strawson 1963). For some of the more 
recent discussion on the topic, see (Railton 2003), (Haslanger 2012), (Eklund 2017), and (Cappelen 2018). 
37 ​For some of our own take on these questions, see (Cappelen 2018) and (Plunkett 2015). Note that the issues here 
about continuity of inquiry have long been at the heart of debates in the history and philosophy of science, especially 
in the wake of (Kuhn 1962/2012). 
38 For more on verbal disputes, see (Chalmers 2011) and (Jenkins 2014). 
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concepts, as Chalmers call them).  A central challenge for such views is to identify in a principled way 39
the bedrock concepts and explain what makes them more fixed than those that can be engineered. A 
separate question is whether bedrock concepts should in some sense be normatively privileged, or 
whether the fact that they are a bedrock is just a descriptive fact about which concepts we happen to be 
stuck with in some sense. 
 
The self-reflectiveness of conceptual engineering: ​Many philosophers engaged in conceptual 
engineering are, unsurprisingly, interested in the concepts used to articulate and describe conceptual 
engineering itself. For example, ​C​O​N​C​E​P​T​ is itself an excellent candidate for conceptual engineering. So 
conceptual engineering can become (and perhaps should become) self-reflective. That self-reflection will 
change the nature of the activity.  
 
Hypocrisy​. How much of a problem is it if one uses (and not just mentions) concept ​C​ to make an 
argument that concept ​C​ should be replaced or revised? Is this an objectionable form of hypocrisy? Or is it 
better described, at least in some cases, as a form of internal critique, or addressing one’s opponents “on 
their own terms”? If so, then perhaps it is sometimes a virtue. The issues here will be particularly 
important for arguments in conceptual ethics involving foundational normative concepts, such as ​O​U​G​H​T​ 
and ​V​A​L​U​E​ , that are hard (perhaps impossible) to avoid using in conceptual ethics. Perhaps it is impossible 
to avoid ‘hypocrisy’ in such cases.  Importantly, these issues of hypocrisy and ineffability not only 40
matter for those engaged in theoretical reflection in conceptual ethics. They also matter for those engaged 
in conceptual activism. For example: perhaps certain ways of advocating for conceptual change inevitably 
involve using the very concepts one aims to criticize. If so, then there are potentially issues involving not 
only hypocrisy here, but also issues of misleading or lying.  41
 
 ​CLUSTER 6 
 
How often are we already engaged in conceptual engineering? And do we need to be aware of doing 
conceptual engineering in order to do it well? ​As we will discuss in a bit more detail later on in this 
introduction, some philosophers think that much of existing philosophical inquiry involves conceptual 
engineering to some degree. Many hold that this engagement with conceptual engineering is going on 
implicitly, perhaps even without the philosophers themselves being aware that is what they are up to.  42
But many are skeptical of such claims. This raises a question: how much does one need to be aware of 
doing conceptual engineering to count as doing it? It also raises the question: how much does one need to 
be aware of doing it in order to do it ​well​? Is explicit engagement with conceptual engineering always 
better than implicit engagement with it? For example, perhaps the best methodology for pursuing 
conceptual engineering (at least in certain kinds of inquiry) is not to focus on conceptual engineering as 
such, but rather just engage in ongoing inquiry into the intuitively relevant subject matter and then just let 
conceptual evolution happen naturally as part of the process. For example: for physicists to improve on 
39 See (Eklund 2015) and (Chalmers 2011). 
40 ​See Alexi Burgess’s chapter “Never say ‘never’” (in this volume) for further discussion. 
41 ​See Rachel Sterken’s “Linguistic Intervention And Transformative Communicative Disruptions” (in this volume) 
for further discussion. 
42 ​For example, see (Thomasson 2016), (Plunkett and Sundell 2013), (Plunkett 2015), and (Ludlow 2014). 
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and introduce new concepts along the way while trying to study physical reality, but without 
self-consciously ever thinking about part of their activity as an exercise in conceptual engineering. 
  
How important is it to have a correct description of our representational devices before we do 
conceptual engineering? ​We’ve described the aim of conceptual engineering as that of assessing and 
ameliorating concepts and other representational devices. How important is it to have a correct descriptive 
account of those devices in order to do the engineering project well? Some analogies spring to mind: to 
think about how to improve a particular bridge, you need to know about that bridge – the ameliorative 
work can’t be done in isolation from the descriptive work. How helpful are such analogies for 
understanding the connection between the descriptive and the normative in the conceptual domain? How 
sharp is the distinction between the descriptive and the normative when doing conceptual engineering, or 
when thinking about concepts (or other representational devices) in general?  
 
Conceptual Engineering, the method of cases, and the role of intuitions in philosophy:​ Many 
philosophers think that the so-called method of cases is central to philosophical methodology and that 
intuitions about cases provide the most important kind of evidence for philosophical theories. One 
(controversial) way to spell out that view goes as follows: We have a concept, ​C​ , and our possession of 
that concept guides the intuitions about ​C​ -related thought experiments. So we can use intuitions about 
whether someone knows in, say, a Gettier case, as evidence of whether ​K​N​O​W​L​E​D​G​E​ applies in that case 
(because the concept somehow guides those intuitions). On this view, intuitions about cases reveal or 
illuminate core philosophical concepts and that is the reason why the method of cases is central to 
philosophy.   43
If, however, your goal is no longer to describe the concepts we have but to improve them – to think of 
how our concepts should be, then it is much less clear that asking questions of the form ‘Is this a ​C​ ?’ 
about an imagined case can serve our purposes. That method, at best, reveals the concepts of ​C​ we as a 
matter of fact have, but our goal now is to think of what the concept ​should​ be.  
 
Role of conceptual history/genealogy:​ Some people (notably Nietzsche in the passage quoted at the 
beginning of this introduction) support claims in conceptual ethics by appeal to facts about the 
history/genealogy of concepts. Or, put in a way that will be more accurate on some theories of concepts: 
they appeal to historical facts about our (or other people’s) engagement and use of those concepts. On the 
one hand, there is an obvious worry here that appeals to conceptual history/genealogy might fall prey to 
versions of the genetic fallacy. On the other hand, there are cases where such historical facts seem at least 
prima relevant to our assessment of our current conceptual practices – e.g., if we had acquired our 
concepts by being brainwashed by an evil scientist, that fact should presumably play a role in our 
assessment and improvement of those concepts.  What role should conceptual history/genealogy have in 
conceptual ethics?  44
 
Let’s take stock of where we are. In this section, we have presented six clusters of domain-independent 
issues in conceptual engineering. The issues interact and overlap in various interesting ways and should, 
43 For a criticism of this way to thinking about the method of cases, see (Cappelen 2012) and Deutsch (2015). 
44 For discussion of this issue, see (Plunkett 2016). 
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we hope, make clear that theorizing about conceptual engineering is fertile ground for philosophical 
exploration. Many of these issues have not yet been systematically explored. There are as of yet few 
efforts to give unified theories of conceptual engineering. It should also be clear from the outline above 
that conceptual engineering interacts in various intriguing ways with topics in ethics, philosophy of 
language, philosophy of mind, philosophical methodology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and 
epistemology.  It also interacts with issues in linguistics, cognitive science, psychology, history, and 
sociology.  Conceptual engineering has implications for those fields, but the theory of it will also draw on 
results from those fields. Towards the end of this introduction we return to the issue of how one can see 
the position of conceptual engineering in philosophy overall.  
 
4. Interaction Between Specific Cases of Conceptual Engineering 
and General Theorizing 
 
The theoretical foundations of conceptual engineering can be interesting in its own right, for much the 
same reasons any topic in philosophy can be. But many of those interested in conceptual engineering (and 
many conceptual activists in particular) are primarily motivated by an interest ​not​ in the general 
theoretical questions of the kind we just raised above for their own sake, but rather by a concern with 
specific concepts or words. For example: the concepts  ​PERSON​, ​FREEDOM, TRUTH, ​race and gender concepts, 
or concepts used for classifying mental illness in psychology. And in most cases they will also be 
interested in the lexical items used to express these concepts. Much of the contemporary discussion in 
conceptual engineering has been driven by concern with specific concepts or words.  
  
In what follows we say a bit about some of the core issues we see involved in the ​interaction​ between the 
general and the specific here: how general theoretical issues (of the sort we canvassed in the last section) 
interact with more “applied” parts of conceptual engineering, focused on a specific concept or set of 
concepts. 
 
Here is an analogy: A question that arises in ​many​ kinds of normative theorizing – including in ethics, 
political philosophy, and epistemology – is in what way (and to what extent) progress on specific cases 
(or more “applied” issues) is tethered to more general theory. For example: if we want to make progress 
on issues about debates in moral philosophy about climate change or abortion, how much (and when) 
should we appeal to a general normative ethical theory (e.g., act-utilitarianism)? What’s the best way to 
proceed with this? Is there a general, informative theory about this methodological question? Or can we 
only answer it when we have a specific set of ethical questions on the table, in particular social-historical 
contexts? Parallel questions arise here in the context of thinking about conceptual ethics. 
 
In a connected vein, we can also ask about the extent to which normative theorizing about a domain 
(whether about systematic/general issues, or more applied issues) is tied to ​meta​-level theorizing about the 
domain. For example: we can ask about the extent to which work in normative ethics (e.g., about whether 
act-utilitarianism is correct) and applied ethics (e.g., about abortion) should be informed by work in 
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metaethics. Even framing this question (as well as our questions in the previous paragraph) inevitably 
raises thorny issues about how (if at all) one should distinguish between these different topics, or projects.  
  
Our goal is not to settle these debates here. Rather it is to flag them, and note their importance for work on 
conceptual engineering. We also want to make a few general remarks about some important points that 
should be kept in mind when thinking about these issues. 
  
First, the basic issues on the table here aren’t idiosyncratic to specifically normative domains. We can 
wonder – for example – about how much our theorizing about a particular topic in linguistics or biology 
should be informed by our more general theorizing in those domains, as well as our theorizing about our 
theorizing in those domains. 
  
Second, it should be clear that in order to engage in conceptual engineering you do not need to have 
worked-out, explicit views on all these issues mentioned above. If that was required, conceptual 
engineering would never have happened. The questions here are about the interaction between more 
general theoretical reflection and more applied issues in conceptual engineering, rather than the issue of 
whether the former is a prerequisite for the latter. 
  
Third, we have many good examples of someone being good at X without being a good theorist about X 
(or of having a theory about what being-good-at-X consists in, or possessing views about the best 
methodology for engaging in X, etc.). For example, many scientists make massively important 
contributions to science while having bad views in the philosophy of science. And many good tennis 
players don’t have good theories of their own activity. Moreover, there might well be costs to theoretical 
reflection as well. Perhaps the time it takes to engage in that reflection could have been spent better doing 
something else. Or, more dramatically, perhaps theoretical reflection will make someone worse at what 
they do; think of a tennis player who can’t serve as well after thinking too much about her serving 
technique. None of this mean that theoretical reflection can’t aid people in many cases. But it does 
suggest we should proceed with caution in assuming theoretical reflection here will be crucial to success. 
  
Fourth, even if the thoughts in the last paragraph suggest some amount of modesty and caution here, we 
don’t want to be overly pessimistic about the contributions of general theory (or meta-theory) about a 
domain to more “applied” or more specific issues. Such theoretical reflection can, and we think often 
does, help make contributions. This is especially so when our theoretical reflection is in relatively good 
epistemic standing, compared to the standing of our theorizing about the more “applied” issues. 
  
Fifth, many find the following view attractive here: the interaction (in terms of evidential import, 
methodology, etc.) between more applied issues and more general issues in conceptual engineering will 
go in ​both​ directions. If some version of that idea is on the right track, then the following becomes 
important: there will be many interesting questions about ​how​ the general informs the specific and vice 
versa. This will, we predict, pattern (at least to a certain degree) in sync with other theoretical domains. 
General theories tend to take the form of models that abstract from the messiness of particular cases and 
that is in part what makes systematic theorizing possible. On the other hand, such models will then 
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include idealizing assumptions that often (or sometimes) will make it hard to see how to apply it to 
particular cases.  
  
Finally, it is worth highlighting that some concepts are tied up with the general theory in a particularly 
direct way: As we mentioned above, the efforts to conceptually engineer concepts such as ‘concept’, 
‘truth’, ‘ought’, or ‘conceptual engineering’ will have a direct and immediate impact on the general 
theory. These are points where the general theory of conceptual engineering and the engineering of 
specific concepts will be deeply connected. 
 
5. Role and scope of conceptual engineering in philosophy: 
Descriptive  
  
One sense we sometimes get when talking to people about conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics 
are that they are ​‘hot’ new topics​ – a ​trendy new field​. While we hope it is true that conceptual 
engineering and conceptual ethics are things that many philosophers will work and think about, it would 
be misleading in the extreme if we gave the impression that these are topics/activities  that haven’t been 
important throughout the history of philosophy. Many philosophers, working in many different theoretical 
traditions, across many centuries, have thought of their work as involving some kind of conceptual 
engineering or conceptual ethics, and/or conceived of the work of other philosophers along such lines 
(even if they didn’t use the terminology we use here.) 
  
For example, consider the founding work of analytic philosophy in the early 20​th​ century. A case can be 
made that much of this work centrally involved conceptual engineering. For example, Frege’s 
Begriffsschrift ​is a paradigm of conceptual engineering: he aimed to improve language for certain 
purposes. As he puts it, ‘If the task of  philosophy is to break the domination of words over the human 
mind . . . then my concept notation, being developed for these purposes, can be a useful instrument for 
philosophers’.  Or take Wittgenstein. In ​Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus​, he aimed to draw a line 45
between what could be said and what could only be shown. You ​shouldn’t​, according to Wittgenstein, try 
to say what can only be shown. The aim of telling philosophers (and others) about the legitimate and 
illegitimate uses of language is a ​normative ​aim.  
 
Next, consider Carnap. His work on explication and language choice are paradigms of conceptual 
engineering. He writes: 
 
“The task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact concept used in everyday life or in an 
earlier stage of scientific or logical development, or rather of replacing it by a newly constructed, 
more exact concept, belongs among the most important tasks of logical analysis and logical 
construction. We call this the task of explicating, or of giving an explication for, the earlier 
concept” (Carnap, 1947, 8-9.) 
45 ​(Frege 1879/1967, 7). 
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Carnap’s interest in conceptual engineering expands beyond the idea of the explication of concepts. For 
example, his criticism of metaphysics as lacking a semantic foundation (as being nonsensical), and his 
proposal for an improved language (inspired by his verificationism), are also deeply bound up with issues 
in conceptual engineering. Importantly, much of the conceptual engineering in early 20​th​-century analytic 
philosophy wasn’t just concerned about purely epistemological or scientific goals. For example, consider 
Carnap’s aim of modifying language to allow multiple people, from multiple places, to engage in 
collective, rational inquiry. Making that possible was in part a ​political​ aim, tied to a democratic, 
enlightenment view of politics that ran through Carnap’s work.  This political side of things is also 46
pronounced in Susan Stebbing’s worries about how certain ways of using key terminology in politics 
(e.g., ‘democracy’ or ‘freedom’) hindered clear thinking about social and political issues, which in turn 
made it difficult to effectively critique the rise of fascism. Stebbing saw analytic philosophy as helping 
provide tools to combat the relevant problematic sorts of thinking; both in diagnosing what was going 
wrong with it and in helping us make it better.  47
 
As this brings out, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Stebbing, and other founders of analytic philosophy were 
extensively engaged in conceptual engineering. So rather than describe conceptual engineering as a ‘hot’ 
new topic in analytic philosophy, we could instead think of it as simply paying more attention to a key 
aspect of analytic philosophy that has been with us since it origins. 
  
Moreover, the idea that key parts of philosophy involve conceptual engineering is hardly parochial to 
self-consciously “analytic” philosophy. Consider here the quote from Nietzsche we introduced at the start 
of this paper, in which he claims that “what is needed above all is an absolute skepticism toward all 
inherited concepts” and that philosophers “must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and 
polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them convincing”.  Nietzsche is here 48
advocating a radical skeptical stance with respect to inherited concepts, as well chastising other 
philosophers for failing to (at the very least) seriously engage that position.  In Nietzsche’s view, it 49
seems, philosophy should involve more conceptual engineering than it in fact has. This attitude is, in turn, 
reflected in his own work. For instance, a good part of ​On the Genealogy of Morality ​can be read as a 
critique of the distinctively ​moral ​concepts that have shaped much of modern life.  To put it in 50
Nietzsche’s own terms (from ​Twilight of The Idols​), we have become “stuck in a cage, imprisoned among 
all sorts of terrible concepts,” and part of his goal is to help us (or at least ​some ​of us) find a way out of 
that cage.  51
46 ​For connected discussion, see (Galison 1990). 
47 See (Stebbing 1939/1941) and (Stebbing 1941/1948). Thanks to Bryan Pickel for helpful discussion of these parts 
of Stebbing’s work. 
48 ​(Nietzsche 1968, 220-221, section 409). 
49 Note that Nietzsche, later on in the passage we quoted, gives a nod to Plato for (at least possibly) seriously 
engaging the kind of radical skepticism about our current concepts that Nietzsche is suggesting. Plato’s defense of 
our concepts, thinks Nietzsche, ​perhaps​ results from him taking the skeptical challenge seriously. He writes: “What 
is needed above all is an absolute skepticism toward all inherited concepts (of the kind that one philosopher ​perhaps 
possessed – Plato, of course – for he taught the reverse).” (Nietzsche 1968, 221, section 409). 
50 (Nietzsche 1887/1994). 
51 (Nietzsche 1889/1954, 502). 
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In the passage from ​The Will to Power​, Nietzsche (in characteristic fashion) positions his views as a 
radical break from much of the history of philosophy. But while Nietzsche might well be advocating for a 
more radical view of conceptual engineering than many have, there is a strong case that some amount of 
conceptual engineering, involving some amount of skepticism toward our inherited concepts, has played 
an important role in philosophy throughout its history. On this front, consider here what Strawson says in 
the introduction to ​Individuals ​about the difference between revisionary and descriptive metaphysics. He 
writes that “descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the 
world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure”.  Strawson describes the 52
revisionist as insisting that metaphysics is “essentially an instrument of conceptual change, a means of 
furthering or registering new directions or styles of thought”.  Importantly, Strawson gestures at a way of 53
reading the history of philosophy as a division between revisionists and descriptivists. He says, “Perhaps 
no actual metaphysician has ever been, both in intention and effect, wholly the one thing or the other. But 
we can distinguish broadly: Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley are revisionary, Aristotle and Kant descriptive. 
Hume, the ironist of philosophy, is more difficult to place. He appears now under one aspect, now under 
another”.  If Strawson is correct, then conceptual engineering has been a key part of the history of 54
philosophy stretching back centuries.  
  
Moreover, the picture we get from Strawson above might well be understating the import of conceptual 
engineering to philosophy. If certain views in the philosophy of language are right, then philosophers 
might be ​tacitly​ engaging in conceptual engineering much more than they realize. For example, consider 
Peter Ludlow’s recent work on what he calls the “dynamic lexicon”. His idea, in rough outline, is that 
speakers regularly adjust and create new meanings for words on the fly in conversation, such that those 
meanings are “dynamic” and in flux. If Ludlow is correct, then much of conversation (including much of 
conversation ​in philosophy​) involves navigating issues in conceptual engineering; including issues about 
what the best meaning of a word is for the context at hand, or going forward into further contexts.  A 55
similar view of philosophy – in which it ​in fact ​involves extensive conceptual engineering (perhaps 
without the awareness of philosophers that it does so) – emerges in the work of other contemporary 
philosophers, including for example, Amie Thomasson and Kevin Scharp.  56
 
What we have just said is of course not even the beginning of a sketch of the role of conceptual 
engineering and conceptual ethics in the history of philosophy. There is rich terrain here to explore in 
many places, including, for example, its role in the Platonic dialogues, Hume, Kant, pragmatism, 
Heidegger, Foucault, Deleuze, Tarski, and ordinary language philosophy. We predict that there are rich 
new perspectives available for readings of the history of philosophy that more actively pay attention to the 
52 (Strawson 1959, 9). 
53 ​(Strawson 1959, 10). 
54 ​(Strawson 1959, 9). 
55 (Ludlow 2014). 
56 ​See (Thomasson 2016) and Kevin Scharp’s chapter “Philosophy As The Study Of Defective Concepts” in this 
volume. See also (Plunkett and Sundell 2013) and (Plunkett 2015) for sympathetic discussion of this possibility. 
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idea of conceptual engineering. We hope that scholars with better historical knowledge than us will write 
histories of philosophy from this perspective. 
  
Of course, it might turn out that that philosophy has ​in fact ​involved extensive conceptual engineering, 
but that it is a deep mistake for it to continue in this vein. Or perhaps the reverse is true: perhaps 
philosophy has ​not​ in fact involved much conceptual engineering and should involve much more. This 
raises further normative issues. These issues are not about the descriptive question about the role that 
conceptual engineering (or conceptual ethics) has played in the history of philosophy (or currently plays 
in contemporary philosophy). Rather, they are about the question of what role conceptual engineering (or 
conceptual ethics) ​should ​play. We turn to this set of questions in the next section. 
  
6. Role and scope of conceptual engineering in philosophy: 
Normative  
 
So what role ​should​ conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics play in philosophy? For ease of 
exposition in what follows, let’s take this question in terms of conceptual engineering. Here’s a way to 
break up that normative question into two components:  
 
1. How many parts of (or subfields of, or issues in) philosophy should conceptual engineering play a 
role in? 
2. For each parts it should be involved in, how important should it be?  
 
Focusing on 1 and 2 makes the answer to the question ‘What role should conceptual engineering play in 
philosophy?’ a matter of degree. Below we briefly sketch possible motivations for four kinds of answers:  
 
1. All of All  
2. All of Some 
3. Some of All  
4. Some of Some  
5. Nothing  
 
1. All of all of Philosophy 
On this view, conceptual engineering should be seen as relevant to every issue in philosophy and it’s the 
only thing that’s relevant. So philosophy should consist entirely of conceptual engineering.  
Kevin Scharp endorses All of All of Philosophy. He argues that all philosophical concepts are defective, 
and that philosophy’s task should be to discover those defects and then create replacement concepts. Once 
that is done, we ship the questions off to the sciences, and that’s the end of philosophy.   57
 
2. All of Some 
57 See Scharp’s “Philosophy As The Study Of Defective Concepts”. 
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This is the view you would hold if you think e.g., Scharp’s view is correct for some parts of philosophy: 
in those parts, conceptual engineering is all there is to do. Then there are some other parts of philosophy 
where there’s more to do than conceptual engineering.  
 
3. Some of All of Philosophy 
 
According to this view, conceptual engineering is relevant to all philosophical questions, but answering 
those questions requires more than doing conceptual engineering (so it is relevant to all of philosophy, but 
isn’t all of philosophy).  
 
One important central argument for Some of All is that we have no particular good reason to think that the 
concepts that we have inherited are ​ideal​ for philosophical theorizing. The default view should be that 
they could be improved. That thought is natural even for those who think we have good reason to preserve 
many of the distinctions found in natural language. For example, in “A Plea for Excuses”, Austin says 
that “ordinary language . . . embodies . . . the inherited experience and acumen of many generations of 
men. . . . If a distinction works well for practical purposes in ordinary life (no mean feat, for even ordinary 
life is full of hard cases), then there is sure to be something in it, it will not mark nothing”.  However, in 58
a point that is often neglected by those who quote the above passage, Austin then goes on to note that 
“ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved 
upon and superseded”.  The challenge here is to recognize when ordinary language is good enough and 59
when it can be improved upon. Philosophy might play a helpful role in that.  
 
One view one could hold in support of Some of All is that the default assumption should be that the 
ordinary distinctions were not made for or developed to be ideal for philosophical theorizing. As a 
corollary, part of what philosophers should do is reflect critically on the usefulness of ordinary concepts 
for philosophical theorizing. A stronger view would hold that the concepts we currently have embody 
ideologies and power structures that can be repressive both on a political and personal level, so there’s a 
responsibility on to always critically examine inherited concepts. On those kinds of views, conceptual 
engineering isn’t All of All of philosophy, but is a part of all of philosophy.  
 
 
4. Some of Some of Philosophy 
 
On this view conceptual engineering should be seen as relevant to some aspects of some philosophical 
questions. This is simply a more restricted version of Some of All. If you think the arguments we just 
sketched for Some of All don’t apply to all philosophical concepts, but to some, this would be your 
favoured normative view of conceptual engineering.  
 
58 ​(Austin 1956, 11). 
59 (Austin 1956, 11) 
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One motivation for excluding conceptual engineering from some domains has been mentioned above: 
Maybe some concepts are so basic that they are irreplaceable and immutable. Maybe ​T​R​U​T​H​ is like that. 
Maybe basic normative concepts, like ​O​U​G​H​T​ , are like that. If so, these are concepts you can use to engage 
in conceptual engineering, but are not themselves engineerable. If so, conceptual engineering is relevant 
in some, but not all philosophical domains. 
 
5. Nothing  
 
According to Nothing, conceptual engineering plays no part in philosophy ​at all​. This is a view the editors 
of this volume bet against, but some contributors to this volume (e.g., Ball and Greenough) flirt with or 
endorse it. Here are three possible motivations for Nothing:  
 
(i) Conceptual engineering requires the existence of concepts, there are no concepts, so we can’t 
do conceptual engineering. Since ought implies can, we shouldn’t do conceptual engineering.  60
(ii) Conceptual engineering involves fiddling with concepts, but fiddling with concepts is 
impossible.  Maybe that is because they are abstract entities (or entities of some other kind you 61
can’t fiddle with). Since ought implies can, we shouldn’t do conceptual engineering. 
(iii)  It simply isn’t within the proper domain of philosophy to fiddle with concepts. Philosophy is 
about reality: knowledge, freedom, meaning, belief, etc. Those phenomena are within the proper 
domain of philosophy, but the concepts are not.   62
 
Most of the chapters in this volume are opposed to Nothing.  This is natural since the aim, in part, is to 63
provide readers with a broad range of frameworks for theorizing about conceptual engineering. In our 
view, it is only when many of those frameworks are on the table that proponents of Nothing will have a 
clear enough target.  
 
 
7. Conceptual Engineering Beyond Philosophy  
 
Almost everything we have said about the potential significance of conceptual engineering (and 
conceptual ethics) apply beyond philosophy to inquiry more generally (as well as to speech and thought 
more generally.) Many of the arguments for the importance of conceptual engineering in philosophy are 
also arguments for its importance in biology, mathematics, physics, psychiatry, law, politics, and ordinary 
life. We use concepts and words in all areas of inquiry, and they can be better or worse relative to the 
60 Note that this presupposes that conceptual engineering requires the existence of concepts in the relevant sense, 
which one of us (Cappelen) rejects. See (Cappelen 2018). 
61 We here use ‘fiddling’ to mean roughly the following: do something with or to. 
62 There is, for example, a way of reading (Williamson 2007) as advocating a version of this view. In fact, we think 
his view is more subtle than this, but we won’t go into the details of it here. 
63 Though see Derek Ball’s chapter “​Revisionary Analysis without Meaning Change (Or,​Could Women Be 
Analytically Oppressed?)” and Patrick Greenough’s chapter “Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering” in this 
volume for views that flirt with or endorse Nothing. 
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goals and standards of a given part of inquiry. Thus, conceptual engineering matters for all domains of 
inquiry.  
 
The point we just made applies beyond inquiry: many activities involve concepts and lexical items in 
various ways. The activity of cooking a dinner depends in part on the chefs’ conceptual repertoire. So 
does hiking, going to war, and making friends. Some activities, like breathing and blinking one's eyes, 
might be independent of our concepts, but the range and significance of concept-involving activities is 
very broad. If that line of thought is correct, conceptual engineering is important not just for linguistic and 
cognitive activities, but also for many other core elements of human life.  
 
These facts about the import of conceptual engineering beyond philosophy help underscore the potential 
significance of philosophical work done on conceptual engineering (and conceptual ethics). At the same 
time, it helps open up potentially fruitful avenues for future research. For once we see the import of 
conceptual engineering to other areas of inquiry – and to a wide range of activities that people engage in – 
we can look to see how conceptual engineering works in these other areas as input to our philosophical 
theorizing about the topic. Such investigation might help us not only better understand how conceptual 
engineering in fact works, but also provide us with helpful material to think about in our theorizing about 
how it should work.  
 
Conclusion  
 
So far we have tried to remain fairly neutral in our presentation. In conclusion, it’s time to put some of 
our cards on the table: we think conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics both ​are​ and ​should be 
central to philosophy. The role of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics in philosophy and other 
areas of inquiry has been underexplored, often overlooked, and typically underappreciated. Philosophers 
have engaged in conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics in various subfields in various time 
periods, and there has been some scattered theorizing about them. But, especially in comparison to a 
range of descriptive questions about concepts and words – including issues about what they are, and how 
we use them – there has been relatively little sustained engagement with the normative and evaluative 
questions about concepts and words at the heart of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. We 
don’t want to hang too much on the question of just how central conceptual engineering and conceptual 
ethics are to philosophy, but whatever degree of centrality one assigns to them, we hope this introduction 
and the contributions in the volume helps highlight a broad range of interesting, important, and 
underexplored questions.  
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